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Cr1m1nal Prosecutions in
Environmental Law· A Study of
the "Kepone" Case
Ronald J. Bac1gal *
Margaret I. Bac1gal • *
INTRODUCTION

The effectiveness of cnmmal prosecutions m the environmental
law area 1s often disparaged. 1 Some commentators suggest that
corporate behavior is not significantly affected by cnmmal convic
t1ons because fines that are adequate to deter mdiv1dual pollutors
often have little impact on multi-million dollar corporations. 2
Such a contention, however 1s challenged by the history sur
rounding the prosecution of the Allied Chemical Corporation for
the pollution caused by the pestmde Kepone. The successful
prosecution of the Kepone case dramatically altered Allied's cor
porate behavior had a significant impact on legislative and admimstrat1ve mspect1on schemes, and led to the establishment of
an endowment for improvement of the environment.
Federal Distnct Judge Robert R. Merh1ge, Jr., presided over a
number of cnmmal cases and Civil smts ansmg from the Kepone
Professor of Law, University of Richmond
• • Associate at Williams, Mullins, Chnstlan & Dobbms of Richmond, Virginia
1. See, e.g., Coffee, "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick"· An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 M1cH. L. REV. 386, 386-87 (1981) (Professor Coffee takes
issue with the longstanding belief that moderate fines do not deter, while severe penalties
flow through the corporate shell and fall on the relatively blameless"); Kraakman, Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L. J. 857 864-65 (l 984) ("lucrative
busmess projects of borderline legality may be worth the wager to the firm even though
they impose legal nsks on managers").
2. The potential madequacy of
$500,000 fine 1s illustrated m the followmg
hypothetical:
Consider, for example, nsk-neutral corporation presented with an opportunity to
procure by bribery government contract that will bnng m profit of $50,000. If the
firm perceives ten percent nsk of conviction, it will assign penalty of $50,000
discounted or expected value of $5,000. Only penalty m excess of $500,000 will
certamly deter profit-max1mmng corporation; any lower penalty leaves positive
net expected gam.
Note, Cnm1nal Sentences/or Corporations: Alternative Fining Mechanisms, 73 CALIF L. REV. 443,
447 (1985).
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mcident. 3 Judge Merhige s handling of the Kepone case and his
creative use of sentencmg stand as a model for future prosecutlons of envtronmental pollutors.
THE KEPONE CASE

The widespread pollution caused by the pestlClde Kepone (pronounced "Key-pone") constituted the largest environmental disaster of the times, resultmg m unparalleled cnmmal v10lations of
federal anti-pollution laws. Allied Chemical Company and associated defendants were indicted on almost eleven hundred cnmmal
charges subJectmg them to maximum fines of thtrty-two million
dollars and possible impnsonment totalling over three hundred
years. 4 On the civil side, smts were filed allegmg more than two
hundred million dollars m Kepone related damages. A separate
class-action smt, brought on behalf of some ten thousand fisher
men and others m manne-related busmesses, claimed a lusty $8.5
billion. Adding msult to Injury a group of stockholders sued Allied's Board of Dtrectors, claimmg that the Board had v10lated its
responsibilities m its handling of the Kepone matter
Aside from the monetary damage, the despoiling of the environment was shockmg. An Environmental Protection Agency
study found traces of the pestlClde Kepone m fish and shellfish as
far as sixty-five miles from the Allied Chemical plant. 5 Fishmg and
crabbmg were banned from Richmond, Virgmia to the Chesapeake Bay amid speculation that the enttre Bay might be contammated. As Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr would observe: "It is
fnghtenmg to thmk how close we came to losmg the Bay as one of
our great natural resources. It is also disheartenmg to view how
derelict government officials were m allowmg this disaster to unfold. "6 The government's neglect was most apparent m the failure of an atr-pollution momtonng station located some two
hundred yards from the Kepone plant. The momtormg station
had collected enough data to mdicate excessive amounts of Ke3. Excerpted in this article 1s chapter from forthcoming biography which pays tribute
to Judge Merh1ge and provides look behind the scenes of his landmark dec1s1on.
4. See, e.g., Umted States v. Allied Chemical Corp., 420 F Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1976).
5. Brown, Kepone Heanngs, New Law Lmdek, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 9, 1976, at
Al, col. 7 The EPA study, ISSUed December 16, 1975, was conducted by EPA Health
Effects Research Laboratory.
6. Interview with the Honorable Robert R. Merh1ge, Jr., U. S. Distnct Court Eastern
Distnct ofVirgima, in Richmond, Virgima Ouly 16, 1986) [hereinafter Merh1ge interview].
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pone were m the ambient air· however the collected air samples
were not analyzed until after the plant closed. Despite the many
environmental laws passed m the 1960s and 1970s, state and federal authont1es did not take action until 1t was too late-too late
for the James River and its aquatic life which became contaminated with Kepone, too late for many fishermen and watermen
who lost their livelihoods when the state banned the takmg of fish
and crabs from the James River and too late for company employees who became senously ill when exposed to Kepone
p01sonmg.
The roots of this tragedy date back to 1951 when Allied Chemical obtamed its first patent to manufacture Kepone as a commer
c1al pestmde. Kepone is a chlonnated hydrocarbon similar to
DDT but with a distmct1ve molecular structure which made assessment of its nature more difficult. A small percentage of Kepone was used m this country as ant and roach bait, while most of
it was shipped overseas as an agncultural pesticide. The federal
Environmental Protection Agency had little familianty with the
environmental effects of Kepone because the pesticide was used
mamly agamst the Colorado potato beetle m Europe, and m Latin
Amencan countnes to control the banana root bore.
Kepone was m1t1ally produced from 1966 until 1973 by an Allied Chemical plant m Hopewell, Virgm1a, a blue collar town that
called itself "the Chemical Capital of the South." However massive quantities of Kepone and the resultmg widespread contamination were not produced until 1974 when Allied relinqmshed
the manufacture of Kepone to a small company named Life Science Products, Inc. The Life Science company was born when
Allied decided to convert its Hopewell plant to plastic production
and consequently sought to spm off the manufactunng of Kepone
to a smaller company exclusively devoted to production of the
pesticide.
Two Allied employees, William P Moore, Jr., research director
at the Allied Hopewell plant, and production supervisor Virgil A.
Hundtofte, used their home and life msurance policies to secure a
$175,000 loan and launch their venture as Life Science Products,
Inc. 7 They immediately set up operation m a converted gas stauon w1thm the shadow of Allied's Hopewell plant. Although Life
7 Eisman, Allied Tnal Offered Scenano of Kepone Pollution, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct.
4, 1976, at Bl, col. 5.
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Science was charted as an mdependent corporation, it had a contractual commitment from Allied to finance mstallat1on of production eqmpment, supply raw matenals, purchase the entire
output of Kepone, and buy out Life Science, Inc. if the company
was unable to contmue operations. This contractual entanglement between Allied and Life Science presented one of the legal
issues whtch Merh1ge had to resolve at the subsequent cnmmal
tnal. The prosecution argued that Life Science was a mere mstrumentality of the Allied Chemical Corporat10n, thus makmg Allied
legally responsible for all actions of Life Science, Inc. 8
Life Science began the manufacture of Kepone m February
l 974, and withm a month senous problems developed. William
R. Havens, supervisor of the Hopewell sewage treatment plant
returned from a month s vacation to find the plant s digester moperable. He noticed that "somethmg that smelled odd was killmg the bactena the digester normally uses to break down waste
matenals." 9 Havens traced the smell back to the tmy Life Science
plant, then took his problem to the city manager and city engineer Havens never learned what action they took, but the oddsmelling chemical kept flowmg through his plant and mto Bailey's
Creek and the James River
By the fall of 1974 the State Water Control Board became
aware of the problem at the Hopewell plant. A young mvest1gator John Blair Reeves, was sent to meet with Life Science offioals,
who ms1sted that Kepone could be successfully filtered out of the
plants waste water Reeves remamed skepttcal and recommended to the Water Control Board that Life Soence be limited
to Kepone discharges of one hundred parts per billion m its waste
water The Board directed Reeves to pressure Life Science mto
acceptmg this standard. However Reeves authonty was under
cut by the Board's concession that legal action could be taken
agamst the city of Hopewell, but not agamst the Life Science
plant. Reeves acknowledged that he was caught m the middle"! got different advice from different lawyers," and he "sort of
harassed" Moore and Hundtofte. 10 But the discharge of Kepone
contmued. The hassling and negot1atmg with Life Science contmued nght up to the plants closmg mJuly 1975.
8. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
9. Eisman, supra note 7 at Bl. col. 2.
10. Id. at Bl, col. 4.
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Throughout its existence, Life Science rarely met the Board's
suggested standard of a discharge of about a pound of Kepone a
day Even when Life Science sought to comply with the em1ss1on
standard, faulty supervlSlon resulted m frequent leaks, boil-overs,
and other problems. On several occasions a full tank of Kepone
had to be flushed, resultmg m the discharge of a thousand
pounds of the chemical at one time. 11 (The allowed discharge
level was only about enough to cover a fingertip.) 12 Such discharges were eqmvalent to a chemical version of the atomic
bomb, for commercial Kepone 1s diluted to 0.125% strength,
while the Kepone discharged from the plant was 88 to 94%
pure. 13 The excessive discharges were well known to city and
state officials, but no strong steps were ever taken to prevent
them. State, city and plant offioals met m March, 197 5 and raised
the possibility of suspending plant operat10ns until new pollution
eqmpment could be mstalled. 14 There was no follow-through,
however because Life Science owner Moore allegedly made
veiled threats that once closed, the plant would never reopen.
The threat to depnve Hopewell of a thnvmg busmess struck
home to a city that had sought to attract mdustry by advert1smg
its many local streams and rivers as "natural sewers" for mdustnal waste. Rather than depnve the city and state of a thnvmg
busmess, the parties agreed to keep the plant runmng, while mcreasmg efforts to meet the suggested em1ss1on standards. Even
after this compromise, Life Science contmued to exceed the
standards.
H. D Howard, general manager of the Life Science plant, contmued to allow excessive amounts of Kepone to flow mto the city
sewer on the assumption that there was "a tacit agreement" with
the city and state to contmue dumpmg as long as timely notice
was given. Howard contacted the city sewage plant before each
discharge and mamtamed that "he would never have allowed any
discharge if the city had told him to stop it." 15 Sewage plant supervisor William R. Havens confirmed that he received such calls
which dutifully reported the gallons of waste and the amount of
II. Id. at Bl, col. 6.
12. Eisman, Hundhofte Contradicts Self on Shipments From Allied, Richmond Times·Dispatch,
Sept. 29, 1976, at Al, col. 6.
13. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 27 1976, at B4, col. I.
14. Eisman, supra note 7 at B4, col. 6.
15. Id.
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Kepone they contamed. Havens never told the plant not to make
a discharge, because "I had no nght to refuse them that I knew
of."i 6 When this scenano was reconstructed at tnal, Merh1ge angrily declared: "It seems that everyone was s1ttmg around on
their couches. It sounds like a bunch of politics, everybody bemg
mce to everybody else."i7
The parties "bemg mce to each other" soon mcluded Allied
Chemical officials. Life Science mformed Allied of the problems
m controlling waste discharge, and officials of the two compames
met m Hopewell onjuly 7 1975.1 8 At the meetmg Allied agreed
to look mto procunng additional pollution control eqmpment,
but Allied contmued to supply raw matenals with knowledge of
the ex1stmg pollution problem. By allowmg Life Science to contmue operations, Allied subjected itself to government charges
that 1t had JOmed an ongomg conspiracy to pollute the
environment.
When government and corporate officials failed to take strong
action to control Kepone em1ss10ns, matters were brought to a
head by employees of Life Science who were exposed to the pest1c1de on a daily basis. Kepone was made by combmmg five chemicals m a steel vessel and then puttmg the end product m a dryer
to elimmate moisture. A thm film of this dned Kepone powder
could be found throughout the plant. Raw matenals and fimshed
products were left lymg on the floor makmg the Life Science
plant a filthy place to work. 19 Employees exposed to this contaminated work place began to display physical symptoms: loss of
equilibnum, memory and coordinauon; slurred speech; heanng
difficulties; mental disorders; twitchmg eyes and hands; loss of
body weight; impaired liver functions; and temporary sterility 20
All of these conditions are now known to be the effects of Kepone
po1somng. At the time, however Moore assured the workers that
16. Id.
17 Eisman, Allied Tnal Offered Scenano of Kepone Pollution, Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Oct. 4, 1976, at Bl, col. l; see Jones, Allied Motions Re;ected, judge Cnt1cal of Firms Role, Richmond News Leader, Sept. 30, 1976, Al, col. 3.
18. Eisman, supra note 7 at B4, col. 6.
19. Gordon, Kepone: Chermcal Remains Fact of Life for its Makers and Watermen, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, June 9, 1985, at DI, col. 3.
20. Brown, Kepone Plaintiffs File Request, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 31, 1975, at Bl,
col. 3; Orndoff, Test Methods in Kepone Case are Complex, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 11,
1976, at CI, col. I; see mterv1ew with Joseph M. Spivey, III, pnvate counsel, Hunton, Williams, Gay, and Gibson, m Richmond, Virgm1a (Aug. 12, 1986) [heremafter Spivey
interview].
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Kepone could cause no harm to human bemgs. Both Moore and
local physmans suggested that the employees' symptoms were
caused by the stress of workmg sixteen hour shifts at the plant.
Interestmgly enough, the only correct medical diagnosis was
offered by a local vetennanan who treated a cat that developed
shakes after sleepmg on the work clothes of a Life Science worker
Upon discovenng that Kepone was a pest1c1de, the vetennanan
advised the owner to keep the cat away from the Kepone and the
shakes will ·~ust go away " 21 The cat did recover but twentye1ght former employees and one spouse were eventually hosp1tal1zed. 22 The human tragedy of Kepone pmsonmg began to unfold
with the solitary v1s1t to a local physman by Dale F Gilbert, an
operations supervisor at the Life Science plant. Gilbert's phys1c1an sent a blood sample to the Umted States Center for Disease
Control, which found highly toxic levels of Kepone m Gilbert s
blood. Withm a week the state ep1dem1ologist v1s1ted the Life
Science plant and exammed ten workers. Seven of them displayed symptoms similar to Gilbert. The next day under threat
of a state order to shut down, Life Science agreed to close
operations. 23
While the immediate v1cums received medical treatment, the
Environmental Protection Agency began an mvest1gat1on of the
scope of the environmental mvas1on ofKepone. The sc1enufic mvest1gat1on was hampered by the absence of ex1stmg methods for
accurately determmmg relauvely small concentrations of Kepone
m air pollution momtonng filters, m soil, m water m seafood,
and m other matenals. The greater part of the six month study
was devoted to developmg, evaluatmg, and validatmg testmg
methods. Testmg for mmute fractional parts of Kepone, explamed one of the states laboratory chemists, "is like lookmg for
a piece of a person m the world's population." 24 The tests re
qmred a great deal of skill, precmon, and expenence, not to menuon considerable recheckmg and validation. When accurate tests
were finally developed, the test results mdicated that the environmental distribution of Kepone extended well beyond Hopewell.
Toxic levels of the chemical could be found m a wide sampling of
21.
22.
23.
24.
1976,

Spivey mterv1ew, supra note 20.
Brown, supra note 5, at A7 col. l.
Gordon, supra note 19, at Dl, col. l.
Orndoff, Test Methods m Kepone Case Are Complex, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. l l,
at Cl, col. l.
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soil, air water fish, and shellfish. The day after the Environmental Protection Agency released its findings, Virgm1a Governor
Mills E. Godwm closed the James River to all fishmg. 25
The national publicity surrounding Kepone polluuon also drew
considerable attention from the federal government. Senate subcommittee mvest1gat1ons began mJanuary 1976, and a House of
Representatives committee held a public heanng m the Hopewell
High School Auditonum. 26 The Congressional committees
sought mformation on how to prevent the recurrence of such a
disaster and also sought to fix the blame for the ex1stmg situation.
Representative Dom1mck V Damels, D-NJ., attached the blame
to the federal Occupauonal Safety and Health Admm1strat1on
(OSHA), which had failed to take action on a Life Science employee s complamt filed some ten months before the plant closed.
Had OSHA acted properly charged Damels, "there 1s a strong
possibility that the Kepone tragedy may have been averted. " 27
Senator James B. Allen, D-Ala., was particularly disturbed that
federal regulatory agencies were remiss and that the Kepone mc1dent came to light only because state agencies "blew the whistle"
on the operation. 28 President Carter m a Norfolk campaign
speech, charged Governor Godwm and Virg1ma Senator Harry F
Byrd, Jr., with "domg nothmg to solve the problem brought
about by kepone.
"29 Godwm fired back: "I think 1t 1s reprehensible that any political candidate would try to capitalize on catastrophe and use human suffermg m order to garner votes." 3 0
While politICal leaders contmued the public debate, pnvate c1t1zens bore the day-to-day burden of the Kepone mvest1gat1on. A
twenty-three member federal grand JUry was impaneled m Richmond and met for four months, hearmg testimony from fifty witnesses and exammmg over five hundred documents. 31 On May 8,
1976, the grandjury handed down 1,094 cnmmal charges agamst
25. Id. at Cl, col. I.
26. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 27, 1976, at B4, col. I.
27 Id.
28. Brown, Not Expert, HundhojteAsserts, Richmond Times-Dispatch.Jan. 27 1976, at Bl,
col. 3; Brown, supra note 5, at A7 col. 5.
29. Robertson & Whitley, Godwin Defends Virginia Kepone Action, Richmond News Leader,
Sept. 9, 1976, at Al, col. 6.
30. Id. at Al, col. 6.
31. Brown, Allied, Hopewell, Others Named zn 1,094 Counts, Richmond Times-Dispatch,
May 8, 1976, at Al, col. 4.

1987]

The Kepone Case

299

Allied Chemical, Life Science, their officers, and the City of
Hopewell. 32
Allied responded to the grand JUry mdictment by leveling its
own charges agamst the government. In a press release issued
w1thm hours of the mdictment, Allied contended that "[t]he
scope of the cnmmal act10ns was unwarranted and unprecedented. The extreme reaction shown by the mdictments appears
to reflect official frustration over the failure of regulatory agencies
to
[do their proper JOb.]" 33 Allied soon found itself fightmg
not only the federal prosecutors, but also an important public re
lat1ons battle. The grand JUry mdictment consisted of the greatest number of cnmmal charges ever brought under the federal
water pollution laws and the sheer magmtude of the numbers created national headlines. The CBS show "60 Minutes" ran a
lengthy story on Kepone featuring an mterv1ew with Life Science
owner Moore. Before a nat10nw1de audience, Dan Rather confronted Moore with Allied's own "Blue Book" studies which disclosed that Kepone was known to cause cancer m laboratory
ammals. Moore was taken aback because Allied had never revealed those studies to anyone. The "60 Minutes" story left Allied and the City of Hopewell with a black eye, and shortly after
the story city officials removed the signs that read, "Hopewell:
Chemical Capital of the South.''
Allied mamtamed that the Blue Books were wholly internal
documents and ms1sted that the adverse publioty and the grand
JUry mdictment were distortions of the facts. Allied parucularly
took issue with bemg portrayed as a callous polluter engaged m
rampant despoiling of the environment. The grand JUry had
listed each day of discharge of Kepone as a separate charge m the
mdictment, thus a thousand separate counts of pollution related
to a smgle pattern of production at one plant. 34 The greatest
number of charges (940) related to the time penod 1966 to 1974
when Allied Itself manufactured the pestlClde Kepone. The re32. Id.
33. Charges Denied By Allied, Richmond News Leader, May 8, 1976, at A4, col. 2.
34. See, e.g., Umted States v. Allied Chemical Corp., 420 F Supp. 122 (E.D. Va. 1976).
This proliferation of counts may no longer be possible after November 1, 1986, the effec
tlve date of 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b). The Code places ceiling, twice the maximum fine for
the most senous offense, on the aggregate of fines court may impose for multiple offenses "that anse from common scheme or plan. This ceiling, however, applies only to
offenses "that do not cause separable or distmgmshable kmds of harms or damage. It 1s
questionable whether each additional day toxic em1ss1on causes separate harm.

300

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL

LAw [Vol. 12:291

mammg charges related to Allied's role as an aider and abettor
and co-conspirator with Life Science, Inc. Also Jomed as co-conspirators were the City of Hopewell and four corporate officials at
Allied's plastics and agricultural divmon plants m Hopewell.
Imually the alleged conspirators presented a umted defense to
the charges. The umted front, however began to weaken as the
mdiv1dual defendants sought to strike favorable plea bargams
with the government. The City of Hopewell pleaded no-contest
to ten cnmmal counts and paid a $10,000 fine m return for dismissal of the remammg charges. 35 At later tnals 1t became appar
ent that Hopewell had been very negligent m allowmg pollut1on
to contmue. Merh1ge now regrets that he imposed only a $10,000
fine. "If I knew then what I know now" he reflects, "I would not
have been so lement." 36 Followmg the Hopewell case, the techmcal supenntendent of Allied's plastics div1S1on pleaded guilty to
makmg a false statement concernmg the discharge of Kepone to
the Environmental Protection Agency and to the Umted States
Army Corps of Engmeers. 37 Soon afterward, the techmcal super
mtendent of Allied's agricultural div1S1on m Hopewell pied guilty
to aiding and abettmg the illegal discharge of Kepone. 38 In other
bench tnals, Merh1ge acqmtted a number of low level Allied employees. He flipantly warned the prosecutors: "I am t conv1ctmg
the shnooks." 39 In a senous vem, he explamed that those employees were products of a time when pollut1on was not part of
the social consciousness. Lower level employees, who had never
even heard of the Clean Water Act, were merely products of a
time and atmosphere when people simply dumped their garbage
m local streams. To Merh1ge, the responsibility for disposmg of
mdustnal waste lay with Allied's corporate hierarchy He would
not penmt the blame to be shifted to low level employees who
merely earned out company policy
Alerted to Merh1ge s reluctance to pumsh lower echelon employees, the prosecutors focused upon Hundtofte and Moore, the
co-owners of Life Science. Hundtofte pied guilty to conspiracy to
35.
36.
37
1976,
31.
38.
39.

Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 9, 1985, at D2, col. I.
Merh1ge mterv1ew, supra note 6.
Hoyle, Allied Not Contesting 940 U.S. Charges, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 20,
at Al, col. I; Charges Denied By Allied, supra note 33, at Al, col. 4; Brown, supra note
Brown, supra note 31, at A I, col. 3.
Interview with tnal paruc1pams; source not for attribution.
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violate water pollution control laws, and no-contest to seventymne other misdemeanor counts. 40 The government accepted
these pleas m return for Hundtofte s agreement to be a prosecution witness agamst Allied and the other defendants. Moore
pleaded no-contest to one hundred and fifty-three pollullon
charges, but refused a government offer to drop half of the
charges if he would confess to the conspiracy with Allied. 41
Moore s refusal to admit the conspiracy proved to be a ke): factor
m Allied's defense strategy 4 2
Allied m1t1ally sought to have its tnal removed from Merh1ge s
JUrtsdict1on because the extensive pretnal publicity was said to
preclude impanelling an unbiased JUry In a related civil suit Mer
h1ge asked the JUry panel if anyone had heard or read about the
Kepone "incident." Before he could be stopped, one Juror arose
and volunteered: "I read about 1t and I thmk that what Allied did
was JUSt terrible." Merh1ge called counsel to the bench and announced: "We are on our way to Elkms, West Virgima." Startled
counsel could only ask: ''Judge, where m God's name is that?"
Merh1ge laughed: "Thats why we are gomg there." The refer
ence to Elkms has become a standard line with Merh1ge. Whenever he suggests to counsel that "we are gomg to Elkms," the
lawyers know that it means a change of venue for the tnal. 43
In the cnmmal tnal, however Allied ultimately decided to
waive a Jury and take its chances before Merh1ge sittmg alone as
the tner of fact. In another surpnse move on August 19, 1976,
the same day that Hundtofte pied guilty Allied pied no-contest to
mne hundred forty counts mvolvmg the illegal discharge of Kepone and two other chemicals. 44 The dec1s1on to plead no-contest was made over the objection of Joseph M. Spivey III, the
chief coordinator of Allied's defense team. Spivey had employed
Murray J. Janus, Merh1ge s former law associate, as a cnmmal law
specialist, and the two men prepared to dispute all of the government's charges. As Spivey andJanus discussed their tnal strategy
they received a phone call from Allied's corporate headquarters
directmg them to enter the plea immediately Janus particularly
felt that it was a bad decmon because: "We could have plea bar
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Hoyle, supra note 37 at A5, col. 4.
Spivey mterv1ew, supra note 20.
See infra note 60 and accompanymg text.
Merh1ge mterv1ew, supra note 6.
Hoyle, supra note 37 at Al, col. I.
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gamed and persuaded the government to drop at least half of the
charges. But we were told to forget the legal maneuvenng. Allied was losmg the public relations battle and wanted to put an
end to most of the controversy " 45
While denymg any responsibility for the cnmmal charges relatmg to the actions of Life Science, Allied reluctantly admitted its
fault m makmg discharges durmg the early years when Allied itself was engaged m the manufacture of Kepone. The Umted
States Attorney angrily requested that Merh1ge refuse to accept a
plea of no-contest46 which was eqmvalent to a guilty plea for pur
poses of the cnmmal tnal, but could not be used as an adm1ss1on
of fault m pending CIVil suits. Simultaneously with the cnmmal
charges, Allied was facmg civil smts seekmg over two hundred
million dollars m damages caused by Kepone. 47 Allied thus
sought to avmd any cnmmal adm1ss10n that could harm its pos1t1on m the Civil smts. While Allied was concerned with its potential liability to pnvate claimants, the prosecution was concerned
with the public s nght to review the details of the Kepone tragedy
Citmg "a great deal of public concern as well as a great deal of
public confus10n," the Umted States Attorney ms1sted that "the
public has the nght to a tnal." The prosecutor was concerned
that Allied officials "still have not come forward and admitted that
they have committed a cnme. " 48
Merh1ge accepted the no-contest plea while publicly announc
mg that he would regard it as the equivalent of a guilty plea. Allied' s plea subjected It to maximum cnmmal fines of $13.24
million, which Merh1ge regarded as senous enough penalties mdependent of the potential Civil damages. Merh1ge also pomted
out that a public record would be made when Allied subsequently
faced tnal on the one hundred fifty-seven other pending cnmmal
charges relatmg to Allied's responsibility for Kepone discharges
made by Life Science, Inc.
At Allied's tnal on those charges, the prosecut10n advanced two
theones to hold Allied responsible for the Kepone em1ss10ns
45. Interview with Murray J. Janus, pnvate counsel, Brenner, Baber & Janus, m Richmond, Virgm1a (May, 1986) [hereinafter Janus mterv1ew].
46. Hoyle, supra note 37
47 Eisman, Kepone L1t1gatron Growing Rapidly, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Sept. 13, 1976,
at Bl, col. 5.
48. Jones, Heanngs to Help Fix Allied Fines, Richmond News Leader, Aug. 20, 1976, at A3,
col. 4-5.
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made by Life Science. The first theory portrayed Life Science as a
"mere mstrumentality" of the Allied Corporation. Life Science s
status as a dependent subsidiary was said to be embodied m a
contractual agreement that provided for Allied to finance the
purchase of production equipment, supply raw materials,
purchase the entire output of Kepone, and buy out Life Science,
Inc. if the company was unable to operate. Under this arrange
ment, the prosecution argued that Life Science was merely another divlSlon of the giant Allied ChemICal Corporation. Allied
was said to hold ultimate authonty over its subsidiaries and thus
could not escape its corporate responsibility by establishmg the
facade of mdependent dummy corporations. Legal analogies
were drawn to Merhige s earlier rulings m the Richmond school
consolidation case which recogmzed that the State of Virgima
could not delegate its desegregation responsibilities to political
subdivlSlons. 49 Applymg this theory of ultimate responsibility to
the corporate sector Allied would not be permitted to delegate
its pollution control responsibilities to corporate subdivlSlons.
The Allied defense team countered this argument by maintaining
that Life Science was at all times a separate and mdependent company which was not controlled by Allied Chemical.
At trial, the evidence of Life Science s mdependent status was
confusing and contradictory Moore testified that Life Science
was an "independent" company that sought business from other
sources. 50 In response to questions from Merhige, however
Moore admitted that the firm s only production work during its
brief existence involved the manufactunng of Kepone for the Allied Corporation. Moore also described the relationship between
Allied and Life Science as very close because "all the money we
got came from Allied." 5 i Merhige appeared skeptICal, andjanus
worned that the defense had lost on the issue of corporate
independence. 52
In order to keep the parties guessing and thus more willing to
negotiate a settlement, Merhige often projects one image during
tnal, then issues a ruling diametncally opposed to the impression
he created. This was one of those occasions. Much to the sur
49. Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, Virgm1a, 338 F Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
50. Jones, Witness Says Allied Alerted, Richmond News Leader, Sepl. 28, 1976, at Al, col.
3.
51. Id. at A4, col. 6.
52. Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45.
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pnse of courtroom observers, Merhige granted the defense motton to dismiss one hundred forty-four charges that Allied was
responsible for illegal em1ss1ons made by Life Science, Inc. 5 3 Mer
h1ge likened Allied' s responsibility to that of a prescnpt1on drug
manufacturer who has a legal duty to warn physicians of the potential dangers of a drug. After that m1t1al warnmg is given, fur
ther responsibility then rests wnh the physIC1an to warn and
mform others. Because Allied had notified Life Science of the nature of Kepone, Allied had no further duty to report to the Environmental Protection Agency or any other regulatory body
Merh1ge concluded that the ultimate fault for the illegal discharges lay with Life Science, thus Allied could not be found
guilty of cnmmal actions performed by Life Science.
The dismissal of one hundred and forty-four counts of the mdictment left the prosecution with only nme viable cnmmal
charges. These charges hmged upon a theory of conspiracy be
tween Life Science and Allied. The government argued that on
July 7 1975, Allied officials met andJomed with Life Science coowners Moore and Hundtofte m an ongomg conspiracy to pollute
the environment. At the meetmg, Allied officials were mformed
that pollution standards were not bemg met and could not be met
without additional pollution control equipment. Allied agreed to
look mto obtammg the necessary equipment, but did not order
Life Science to cease production of Kepone. Life Science contmued to make illegal discharges from July 7 until its closmg onjuly
24, thus, according to the prosecution, Allied knowmgly acquiesced m the illegal pollut10n of the James River 54 The defense
demed that Allied had approved of further illegal discharges, and
the question of exactly what had happened at the July 7th meetmg
was presented to Merh1ge.
The prosecution built Its case on the testimony of Moore and
Hundtofte, the former partners who were now at odds with each
other They had struck different plea bargams with the government: Hundtofte confessed to the conspiracy charge, while
Moore ms1sted that no conspiracy had ever existed. They also
attempted to attribute the major share of the blame to each other
Hundtofte testified that Moore "was m charge of the quality control operation," 55 while Moore asserted that Hundtofte "called
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Jones, supra note 50, at A4, col. 4.
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the shots" m regard to Kepone production. 56 With respect to the
Allied Corporation, Moore and Hundtofte contradicted not only
each other but also their own earlier statements.
Testifymg for the government, Hundtofte unhes1tatmgly stated
that Allied contmued to supply raw matenals after the July 7th
meetmg. When pressed on cross-exammat1on, Hundtofte admitted that he was not really sure if Allied had supplied any chemicals after July 7 57 Moore was an even less convmcmg witness.
On direct exammat1on Moore testified that he had contmuously
mformed Allied of the Life Science plant's failure to meet em1ss1on standards. Defense counsel Murray Janus then produced a
letter Moore wrote m March 1975, m which he reported to Allied
that Life Science was complymg with federal environmental standards. When asked about the mcons1stency Moore responded:
"I've been mterv1ewed by so many lawyers that if I don't tell
somethmg crossways I thmk I should get a medal. " 58 Moore had
m fact been forced to testify m many proceedings: before the
Senate, the House of Representatives, the Grand Jury and m a
number of depositions. Cross-exammat1on was facilitated by Janus s cross-referencmg of all the previous testimony "If Moore
mentioned safety goggles," Janus explamed, "I could flip to six
previous statements on goggles. As often as not he had said six
different thmgs, all under oath. Cross-exammat1on was a piece of
cake. " 59 On re-direct exammat1on, Moore agam changed his
story to an assertion that he was "certam" that no dec1s10ns regarding water pollution were made without discussions with Allied officials. Moore, however retreated from this pos1t10n when
he affirmed that he had refused the government s offer to plea
bargam to a conspiracy charge because, "I felt on my part there
certamly was no conspiracy " 60 Dunng another part of his six
hour testimony Moore conceded that when mformed of the pollution problem on July 7 Allied never suggested closmg the Life
Science plant. "Allied mdicated that they needed the product,"
confessed Moore, "and Life Science certamly needed to produce
it to stay m busmess." 61 Faced with such mcons1stenc1es and con56.
57
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. col. 8.
Eisman, supra note 12, at Al, col. 7
Richmond News Leader, Sept. 28, 1976, at A4, col. 8.
Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45.
Jones, supra note 17 at AS, col. l.
Id.
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tradict1ons m the government s case, the defense asked Merh1ge
to dismiss the conspiracy charges agamst Allied.
Merh1ge demed the motion because he felt that the government had made out a mm1mum pnma facia case that Allied had
part1Cipated m a conspiracy to v10late water pollution laws. The
government s case was admittedly weak, but not so weak that 1t
could be thrown out of court on purely legal grounds. Merh1ge
was further troubled by the conflictmg testimony and by the legal
question of who bore the responsibility for ordenng Life Science
to cease operations. Janus argued that responsibility for enforc
mg pollut10n control reqmrements lay "where the pipe has the
water The City of Hopewell and the Environmental Protection
Agency were responsible for momtonng discharges from the
plant. Thus the responsibility for closmg the plant should not be
placed on Allied, which functioned merely as a customer of Life
Sc1ence."62 Merh1ge took the argument under advisement with
the comment that: "Your theory Mr Janus, has occurred to the
court." 63 Merh1ge, however did not wish to resolve the legal
quesuon until he had heard all of the evidence, thus he directed
Janus to go forward with the defense case.
Dunng an overmght recess, the Allied defense team debated
whether to present the defense case or to waive the presentation
of evidence and stake its chances for acqmttal on the weakness of
the prosecuuon s case. 64 The situation presented a dilemma familiar to cnmmal defense attorneys. An expenenced defense
counsel can sometimes discern when the prosecuuon has failed to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In such mstances 1t is
shear folly to present defense evidence. Defense witnesses may
be caught m mconsistenc1es or reveal previously undisclosed evidence. The prosecution can then use the defense witnesses to
plug gaps m its case and thus prove the cnmmal charge based on
evidence offered by the defense. On the other hand, the difficulty
with wa1vmg the presentation of evidence 1s that counsel can
never be sure if the judge agrees that the prosecuuon has failed to
prove its case. Absolute certamty m reading a Judge s mmd 1s
impossible, particularly if the judge 1s Robert R. Merh1ge, Jr To
waive the presentation of all defense evidence would mean a total
62. Janus interview, supra note 45.
63. Id.
64. Spivey Interview, supra note 21.
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commitment to gambling on counsel's ability to read Merh1ge s
current leanmgs.
The defense team was badly split over the question of wa1vmg
or presentmg the defense evidence, if any Allied's m-house
counsel argued to present all of the defense case, while associated
counsel argued that no evidence should be mtroduced. The
stalemate was broken late that mght when Allied's president left
the declSlon to Murray Janus-"We h1red Murray as our crimmal
law specialist and we ve got to go with his Judgment." 65 Janus
based his declSlon on his ability to read Merh1ge s mmd: "I felt
that Merh1ge was leanmg toward acqmttal, but I also felt that he
was lookmg for some help. He needed somethmg more to hang
his hat on. I decided to hedge our bets by offering JUSt a very
small part of the defense case. Not enough to give the prosecution any ammurnt1on to use agamst us, but JUSt enough to tip the
scales and push Merh1ge toward an acqmttal." 66 When the de
fense opened its case, Janus called only two witnesses. Moore
took the stand to reaffirm that Allied had expressed a des1re that
he contmue operations, but he also testified that he did not feel
that Allied had agreed to illegal discharges of Kepone. Moores
multiple mcons1stenc1es had eroded his credibility as a witness,
but the other defense witness offered devastatmg testimony Janus called to the witness stand an Allied official who attended the
meetmg with Moore and Hundtofte. The witness admitted that
he left the July meetmg with the understanding that Life Science
could not meet discharge reqmrements while operatmg at capac
1ty However he also understood that the City of Hopewell had
reqmred Life Science to mstall three 20,000 gallon tanks to store
Kepone waste prior to discharge. In the mmd of the witness there
was a clear understanding that the waste would be held m the
tanks until properly treated. He vehemently asserted that:
"There was no agreement to knowmgly violate the law " 67 Janus
thus argued that although Allied might have stopped the illegal
discharges by refusmg to supply raw materials or by refusmg to
accept delivery of Kepone, the legal responsibility to stop Life
Science did not rest with Allied. While Janus conceded that Allied could have done more to stop the pollut1on, he vehemently
65. Id.
66. Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45.
67 Id., see also Eisman, Kepone Case Conspiracy Not Proved, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct.
1, 1976, at Al, col. 7
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asserted that mere negligence was not sufficient to establish guilt
of a cnminal conspiracy
Faced with this strong demal from Allied, and unable to resolve
the conflicting testimony of the government witnesses, Merh1ge
cleared Allied of all responsibility for Life Science s illegal discharges of Kepone. Merh1ge concluded that there was "simply
not sufficient evidence that Allied knowingly aided and abetted in
the illegal discharges from the Life Science plant. The evidence
leaves me with a reasonable doubt and I have no ch01ce but to
acqmt the defendant Allied Chemical Corporation. " 68 Merh1ge
dutifully followed the constitution in affording Allied its presumption of innocence and its nght to force the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Merh1ge steadfastly refused
to allow the public hystena over Kepone to lead to a tainted conviction. The Allied defense team (a considerable group) was estatic over the acqmttal and staged an all-mght celebration at a
prominent restaurant. The bill for the victory party was rumored
to be the largest in the history of Richmond. The celebration
paled, however when Merh1ge subsequently pointed to the pendmg sentencmg heanngs on Allied's no contest pleas, and announced: "When they are convicted they're gomg to know
they ve been convicted. " 69
Although the legal maneuvenng m the conspiracy case had
temporarily overshadowed the human aspect of the Kepone tragedy Merh1ge s watchful eye had discerned the plight of the Ke
pone v1ct1ms. Almost forgotten at the conspiracy tnal was the
man who had started the Kepone mvest1gation by sending his
blood sample to the Umted States Center for Disease Control. 70
When Dale Gilbert appeared as a witness, his courtroom demeanor was a dramatic reminder of the human suffenng caused
by Kepone po1sonmg. Gilbert's unsteady walk to the witness
stand revealed his disturbed equilibnum and his hands shook violently throughout his testimony The image of this broken man
may have remained with Merh1ge when he sentenced Allied on
the nine hundred forty charges to which Allied had earlier
pleaded no-contest.
Merh1ge also heard disturbmg accounts of Life Science s failure
to protect its employees. A Life Science worker recalled that:
68. Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45.
69. Eisman, supra note 67 at AIO, col. 4.
70. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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"Nobody ever said this stuff was dangerous. I was told 1t was not
harmful and you could eat the stuff and it's not gomg to hurt
you." 71 The state ep1dem1ologist described the employees working conditions m the Life Science plant as incredibly lax and
sloppy The Life Science plant was hot, steamy and covered with
Kepone dust. The workers got the dust over their clothes and
bodies, they mhaled 1t, and ate their lunches m 1t. When they
went home, the Kepone contammated their houses. The threat to
the workers families became apparent when Gilbert's wife was
hospitalized for liver problems brought on by prolonged exposure to the Kepone dust brought mto her home. 72 At one pomt m
a related civil tnal, Allied asked Merh1ge to order the workers to
Duke Umvers1ty Hospital for tests, mcluding surgery to deter
mme the extent of their InJUry Merh1ge would not allow such
"invasive surgery " but the workers were mcensed that Allied had
made such a request. 73 The workers were also bitter that Moore
and Hundtofte had offered repeated assurances that the Kepone
dust was harmless. One employee referred to Moore and
Hundtofte as Jerks and liers. "Nothmg will ever change my mmd
that they knew the 1mplicat10ns of this stuff," William A. Moyer
Jr charged. "If I were to see one of those two guys agam, I
wouldn't be responsible for my actions." 74 Merh1ge could do
little to directly aid the actual v1ct1ms of Kepone p01sonmg because personal compensation of InJUred parties must be addressed by civil smts, not by cnmmal fines. 75 Merh1ge was also
aware that the acqmttal m the conspiracy tnal had placed Allied m
a strong bargammg pos1t1on with respect to the civil litigation.
Because of his ruling that the now defunct Life Science company
was not m conspiracy with, nor a mere mstumentality of Allied,
71. Gordon, supra note 19, at DI, col. I.
72. Id. at col. 4.
73. Spivey mterv1ew, supra note 21.
74. Gordon, supra note 19, at DI, col. 4.
75. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3556, the court may order the defendant to "make restitution to
any victim of the offense m accordance with the prov1s1ons of sections 3663 and 3664.
Section 3663(b) provides that the court may order return of property or damages m the
case of an offense "resultmg m damage to or loss of or destruct10n of property of victim
of the offense. Query: If Kepone contammatlon forced Chesapeake Bay fishermen out of
busmess, were the fishermen "victims" and were their lost profits damages"? Can the
sentencmg process be converted mto system for awarding compensation to v1ct1ms without v1olatmg due process or eclipsmg the defendant' consutut1onal nght to JUTY tnal?
See generally Note, The Unconst1tut1onality of the Victim and Witness Protection Act Under the Seventh
Amendment, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1590 (1984).
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there was little chance that the civil plaintiffs could recover damages from the Allied Corporation-the "deep pocket" in the civil
cases.
Merhige s insight as to potential civil liability proved accurate
when over $200 million in personal injury smts were settled out
of court for a mere $3 million. 76 Allied agreed to this modest
settlement because it had learned from the criminal trial that even
successful litigation could be more expensive than the costs of a
settlement. An expensive public opimon poll had been financed
by Allied in support of its motion for a change of venue, and over
a thousand witnesses scattered throughout the country had been
interviewed and deposed for the criminal trial. Even the briefest
deposition can run twenty pages, while those taken from potentially important witnesses can run several hundred pages. At that
time, court reporters charged $60 per day to record testimony
and an additional $1.75 for each page of testimony which was
typed. 77 Such costs were considerable, but by far the largest ex
penses were the lawyers fees, particularly in light of Allied's decision to employ a number of prestigious Richmond law firms.
Fortune magazine characterized the Kepone litigauon as "the biggest windfall to hit Virginia s legal industry since personal-injury
smts were invented." 78 Murray J. Janus confirms that the legal
fees were very substanual-"There were six lawyers and numer
ous para-legals working full time on that case for a year " 79 In
light of the costs of defending agamst the crimmal charges, settling the civil smts for $3 million was a substantial victory for
Allied.
Allied's strmg of victories ended the day that Merhige imposed
sentences for the nine hundred forty criminal pollution counts to
which Allied had pleaded no-contest. Merhige grudgingly ac
knowledged that Allied had generally been "a good corporate citizen. " 80 He refused, however to be swayed by the company s
argument that the dumpmg had been done innocently or madver
tently Merhige imposed the maximum fine of $13.24 million m
order to deter offenders everywhere. He announced his "hope
after this sentence that every corporate official, every corporate
76.
77
78.
79.
80.

Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 9, 1985, at 02, col. 2.
Eisman, supra note 47 at B4, col. 6.
Zim, Allied Chemical's $20 Million Ordeal with Kepone, FORTUNE, Sept. 11, 1978, at 88.
Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45.
Merh1ge mterv1ew, supra note 6.
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employee that has any reason to thmk pollution 1s gomg on, will
thmk, if I don't do somethmg about 1t now I am gomg to be out
of a JOb tomorrow "81
Legal second-guessers speculated that Allied should have
sought an out-of-court settlement rather than expose Itself to
Merh1ge s mercies. Janus admits, "we undervalued the case. This
was the first case of this magmtude and nobody could assess 1t.
Judge Merh1ge has a smcere belief m environmental protection,
and I had to learn that the hard way Hell, when we were m prac
uce together neither one of us could pronounce or spell environmental law No one could back then." 82 Janus was unaware that
Merh1ge s environmental consc10usness had been raised dunng
his vISits to Europe. While on his 1965 sabbatICal to Spam, Mer
h1ge had been impressed with the lovely clear waters off the south
of France. Five years later he returned to the spot to find the
waters contammated with mdustnal pollution. Although Merh1ge
mamtams that "I wasn t lookmg to pick on Allied or anyone else,
I was very concerned with what was happenmg to our
environment. " 83
Allied did make a halfhearted attempt at negot1at1on, offenng
to settle the cnmmal case for $2 million m fines. However Justice
Department officials regarded the offer as a cocky take-it-or-leave
1t proposal that left no room for additional negot1at1ons. Accordmg to Justice Department sources, the government had been prepared to settle for about five or six million dollars. 84 On the
defense side, Janus mamtams that 1t was the Justice Department
which failed to negotiate m good faith. 85 Janus also expresses disappomtment m Merh1ge s sentence. "Its the only time I've ever
been upset w1thjudge Merh1ge," bemoans Janus. "Hes a consc1ent1ous judge who normally agomzes over sentencmg. But this
ume I thmk he made up his mmd before he ever heard the evidence m m1t1gat1on. We had obtamed a very favorable probation
report whICh Judge Merh1ge brushed aside as a snow JOb we had
done on the probation officer Thirteen million dollars was the
largest fine ever imposed at that time, and I thmkjudge Merh1ge
paid too much attention to his place m history " "On the other
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id., see generally Richmond News Leader, Aug. 20, 1976 at Al col. I.
Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45.
Merh1ge mterv1ew, supra note 6.
Janus mterv1ew, supra note 45.
Id.
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hand," Janus admits, 'Judge Merhige did give us a falf shake on
the conspiracy charge. His potential place m history didn't color
his objectivity and he didn't hesitate one bit to enter an acqmttal
when the ev1dence was msuffioent." "Still," Janus reflects, "I
took the sentence personally because we worked so hard to show
that Allied was a good corporate Citizen. Judge Merhige JUSt
wouldn t listen. Hell, if he had knocked $100,000 off the maximum I could have at least felt that my hard work had saved Allied
somethmg. '' 86
In typical fashion, Merhige handles the cnllcism with humor
When mtroducmg Janus at a Bar function, Merhige announced:
"I made Murray famous. I gave him a place m history by hittmg
him with the largest cnmmal fine ever recorded. Although I'm
not m the habit of explammg my decisions, I thmk you are entitled to know why I imposed that fine. I fined your client $13.24
million because the law would not permit me to fine them $13.24
milliion and one dollar " 87 In a senous vem, Merh1ge explams
that the Kepone mcident was "a smful thmg, because it was so
mdiscnmmate m its mJury I get upset when a cnminal robs one
citizen, but indiscnmmate cnmes like pollution or counterfeitmg
keep Circulatmg and hurtmg more and more people. I believe m
stiff penalties for such mdiscnmmate cnmes." 88
Although Merhige imposed the maximum penalty on Allied, he
displayed his charactenstic creauvity m handling the case. Cnm1nal fines are normally deposited with the federal treasury but
Merhige sought to return some of the money to the Citizens of
Virgima who were the indirect victims of the poisoning of thelf
environment. Merhige announced from the bench that he would
"be mterested m any legal method to keep that money m Virgima
to help the people directly mJured by Kepone. "89 Merhige s suggestion proved to be the genesis of the Virgima Environmental
Endowment. He imposed the maximum fine of $13.24 million,
but reduced the fine to $5 million contmgent upon Allied's agreement to establish an $8 million endowment to improve the environment. Merhige s approach benefited the cillzens of Virgima
and the Allied Corporat10n which was able to take a tax deduction
on the contribuuon, thus reducing the net cost of the tnal's out86.
87
88.
89.

Id.
Merh1ge mterv1ew, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
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come by $4 million. Neile Cotiaux, who won two national news
awards for his coverage of the Kepone mcident, regards Mer
htge s sentence as a stroke of gemus: "Creative law at Its best, for
the benefit of the people."90
The establishment of the eight million dollar Virgmia Environment Endowment may provide long range benefits for the State
ofVirgmia, but Its immediate impact was to complicate resolut10n
of the Kepone mcident. The State of Virgima filed smt agamst
Allied for the damage done by Kepone and for the costs of
cleanup projects. Costs which were projected to run as high as
$15 million. 91 The state demanded that Allied pay the full costs,
while Allied msisted that the state government and the newly created Environment Endowment Fund bear a portion of the costs.
The Endowment, however took the position that no funds would
be released until the state and Allied had reached a final settle
ment on cleanup costs. 92 Two years later the stalemate was finally
broken when the state and Allied agreed that Allied would pay
$5.25 million for Kepone related damages, while the state would
accept a three year moratonum on its smts to recover the costs of
the Kepone cleanup.93 This payment to the state brought to more
than $20 million the amount that Allied had paid m connection
with Kepone contammation. In addition to the $5.25 million settlement with the state, Allied contributed $8 million to found the
Virgima Environmental Endowment, paid $3 million in settlements with former employees, and also had to pay the $5 million
fine levied by Merhige. When legal expenses are added m, Kepone connected damages are estimated to have cost Allied well
over $30 million.

90. Interview with Neile Cot1aux, fonner news reporter in Richmond, Virginia (May 14,
1986). The propnety of corporate penance through judicially mandated chantable awards
1s still being debated by the courts. See, e.g., Umted States v. Wnght Contracting Co., 728
F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1984) (reversing chantable contribution on govemment' appeal). U.S.
attorneys often feel duty-bound to challenge such transfers from the government's coffers
to the chanty s. In the Kepone case, however, the prosecutor offered only token resistance
to Merh1ge
creative sentencing.
91. Eisman, Allied Volumes Point to Awareness by Pair Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 19,
1977 at Cl, col. 4; Zim, supra note 78, at 90.
92. Hoyle, Allied is to Pay State, Hopewell $5.2 Million, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Oct. 14,
1977 at Al, col. 7
93. Id. at Al, col. 4.
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POST-SCRIPT

Even when the financial costs are tallied, 1t 1s difficult to assess
the final impact of the Kepone disaster The happiest part of the
story 1s the extent to which the IIlJUred workers have been re
turned to good health. Unlike most chemicals mtroduced mto
the body Kepone tends to recycle Itself, slippmg out of the mtestines to return to the liver and work its way through the system
agam. In addition, the Medical College of Virgm1a discovered a
drug which speeds the elimmat1on of bile aCids from the body
and has been able to cut the average half-life of Kepone m the
body from a hundred and sixty-five days to eighty days. As a result, all of the Life Science workers treated at the Medical College
of Virgima have been virtually cured. 94 The short run medical
effects of Kepone have been elimmated, although the long range
spectre of cancer still hangs over the v1cums. Kepone has produced cancer m laboratory ammals and its long run effect on
humans 1s unknown. 95
The long run effect on the environment 1s also unclear Ke
pone 1s extremely persistent once 1t enters the environment, and
1s not easily broken down m nature. Some ten years after the last
Kepone was made, fish and streams are still contammated above
safety levels set by the Federal Govemment. 96 Even though the
Kepone level 1s droppmg, this does not mean that 1t 1s disappear
mg. Dr Michael E. Bender of the Virgm1a Institute of Manne
Science explamed that Kepone 1s an mcredibly stubborn chemical, and 1t 1s JUSt that the Kepone-laden sediments are bemg
slowly buried by newer material settling on the river bottom. 97 A
maJor disturbance, such as a hurricane, could stir up the sediments and send the Kepone levels higher The Kepone threat remams buried m river sediments, but dredgmg the river bottom 1s
not a realistic soluuon. It could cost as much as $500 million to
dredge the entire 200-square-mile area, and the dredging process
might do more harm than good smce 1t would stir up the toxic
chemICal. Kepone 1s likely to remam a problem m the Chesapeake Bay for decades.
94.
95.
96.
97

Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 9, 1985, at D2, col. I.
Gordon, supra note 19, at DI, col. 4.
Richmond Times-Dispatch, June 9, 1985, at D2, col. I.
Id. at D2, col. I.
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On the plus side, there has been dramatic improvement m the
environment immediately surrounding the former Life Science
plant m Hopewell. A new regional sewage treatment plant has
deaned up Bailey s Creek and the James River where mdustnal
wastes used to flow "You had to hold your nose when you went
across Baileys Creek before," observed Hopewell Mayor Hilda
M. Trama. "Now we have people down there fishmg." 9 8 In the
corporate sector Allied Chemical Corporation moved to tighten
its control of manufactunng. The company adopted a new mcent1ve-compensat1on program downgrading profitability as a measure of a manager s performance and givmg much greater weight
to a regard for soCial and environmental responsibilities. 99 Cor
porate profits have also taken a back seat to Allied's concern for
avmding further problems with Kepone. The Company paid a
West German firm 25 cents a pound to bury its Kepone supplies,
at a time when the European pnce for a Kepone-denved pesticide
had soared to $55 a pound. Feanng future problems, Allied simply refused to sell any more Kepone. 100
Perhaps the biggest gam from the Kepone disaster 1s the public
awareness of workplace hazards. Today's workers are more likely
to complam and to be heard by regulatory agencies. The director
of safety standards for the federal Occupational Safety and Health
Adm1mstrat1on recently observed that: "The Kepone mc1dent
probably had the greatest impact on the agency of any disaster
that occurred, m terms of puttmg the 'H' m OSHA. Before Kepone, we were basICally a safety agency " 101 There 1s, however
less than umversal praise for the federal government s heightened concern for employees welfare. Margaret Simmano, AFL
CIO associate director for occupational safety and health,
charged that the Reagan adm1mstrat10n was destroymg the regulatory process and turnmg back the clock to the pre-Kepone
days.102
Whatever has happened at the federal level, the State of Vir
gm1a has taken strong steps to prevent another Kepone debacle.
The State Bureau of Occupational Health has assumed sole re98. Id. at D2,col. 2.
99. See Zim, supra note 78, at 91.
100. Id. at 90.
101. Gordon, Kepone Helped Bnng Passage of New Laws, Richmond Times-Dispatch, June
9, 1985, at DI, col. 2.
102. Id.
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sponsibility for health mspectlons, and where there had previously been eleven mspectors, there are now thirty mdustnal
hygiemsts and forty-two safety mspectors. 103 Many new laws and
regulations have also been enacted to more closely momtor pollution. Faith m those new laws, however must be tempered with
the pragmatism offered by Dr Robert B. Stroube, assistant commiss10ner of the Virgima Health Department. "The laws are m
place to prevent another Kepone [incident], but there have been
laws agamst murder for a long time, and people are still gettmg
killed." 104

103. Id.
104. Id. at DI, col. I.

